Welcome to the first edition of my newsletter, "Vectors for Safety". Everybody needs a soapbox and this is mine. In future issues I will use this commentary section to blow off steam, criticize, praise, explain, or otherwise express my thoughts on what is happening in this ever-changing world of aviation.

My focus will generally be centered on safety issues rather than industry and association news. Don't expect to find a list of fly-in breakfasts, rumors of infighting within various alphabet groups, or tales of flights to exotic destinations.

I will do my best to make this newsletter relevant, informative, and useful. I will attempt to constantly improve the newsletter's content and format. That can only be done with the help of you, the reader. So please let me know what you think and give me ideas on how to improve as well as suggestions for future topics. Email me at gene@genebenson.com or click here to open a secure comment form.

Do you know the three functions of the engine oil? Everybody knows that the oil is pretty important stuff and that the engine won't run for very long without it. But it does much more in its critical role in lubricating all those galloping parts. It is also an essential part of the engine's cooling system.

Most airplanes are air-cooled in contrast to most cars which are liquid cooled. Air passing through the cowling picks up heat from the cylinders and carries it away. That works well for the heat that makes it to the outer reaches of the engine, but not so well for the parts deep within the engine's core. The oil lubricating those moving parts is also heated by them. The oil is usually routed through an oil cooler which resembles a small radiator. Airflow is directed at the oil cooler and carries away some of the heat, cooling the oil and therefore also cooling the engine's innards. That explains why one of the main causes of high oil temperature is insufficient oil quantity. Even though there may be enough oil to lubricate, there might not be enough to cool properly. So, think twice about flying when the preflight reveals that the engine is a couple of quarts low on oil.

If that wasn't enough, the oil also helps clean the engine. Combustion of gasoline and air is a rather dirty process. Lots of contaminants are produced. As the oil circulates, it picks up most of these contaminants and either keeps them suspended until the next oil change or deposits them in the oil filter.

So the next time you play aviation trivia, (or take an FAA oral exam) you can know that the oil lubricates, cools, and cleans.

Whether a multi-thousand hour pilot or a newly certificated one, it never hurts to brush up on the basics. My operational tip in this edition relates to crosswind landings.

I don't have any statistics to back it up, but it seems that there has been a substantial increase in the number of runway excursions over the past year. Most of these excursions seem to have happened when a pilot was executing a landing in a crosswind.

Any pilot contemplating a crosswind landing must ask two questions. 1. Can the airplane handle it? 2. Can the pilot handle it? For the first question we need to refer to the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) and determine the demonstrated crosswind component. This is not (yet anyway) a limitation and therefore a regulatory requirement. It is simply what the manufacturer demonstrated with the airplane. But it is generally good to consider it a limit. Of course the limit for the specific airplane type must be known. A comfortable crosswind for a Bonanza might not be possible in some LSAs. The airplane's actual limit is reached if, while in the slip toward touchdown, either full aileron or full rudder is insufficient to correct for the wind. For the second question, a pilot must be honest and consider crosswind proficiency and recent experience. Outside factors such as someone waiting at the airport must not push a decision to attempt an unsafe landing. If there is not a more favorable runway at the destination, there is probably another airport with more suitable conditions in range.

The landing begins early in the pattern when we check the wind indicators to see exactly what we will be up against. We estimate the amount of heading correction to fly parallel to the runway on downwind and then adjust it as necessary. This will give us an estimation of what the correction angle will be in the early stages of final approach. We will anticipate the wind when making the turn from downwind to base so as to avoid overshooting or undershooting. We will consider whether the crosswind is producing a headwind or tailwind component while on base and adjust the turn to final accordingly.

Once on final we will fly a wind correction angle to maintain our track along the extended runway centerline until we are reasonably close to the runway. How close is a matter of personal preference, but don't transition to the slip too soon. Be sure to comply with any airplane limitation regarding the maximum time to remain in a slip. Causing an engine failure in the pattern by unporting the fuel supply won't result in a happy ending. As we near the runway we will transition to the slip with sufficient time to get established.

Executing the landing requires us to do something we were trained not to do - cross the controls. We will lower the upwind wing by use of the ailerons while simultaneously applying rudder in the opposite direction. Here is where the finesse comes in. Be sure to touchdown with the airplane tracking down the runway centerline and the longitudinal axis of the airplane parallel with the centerline. If the wind is gusty, the amount of aileron will have to be constantly adjusted to keep the airplane tracking the centerline and that will result in constant adjustment of the rudder to maintain longitudinal axis alignment. Too much aileron and the airplane drift to the upwind side of the runway and too little aileron will cause drift in the opposite direction. Too little rudder and the nose will yaw toward the upwind side and too much will have the opposite effect. If done properly, the airplane contacts the runway smoothly and begins to track down the centerline without any significant jerk toward either side. If not done well the airplane will make an effort to depart the pilot's control and go play in the grass or do the tango with the airport fence, a hangar, or a parked airplane.

This jerk is caused by placing side loads on the landing gear. A side load is created whenever a load bearing tire's path and heading diverge. The side load is accompanied by tire distortion. Side load varies with type of tire and air pressure but it is independent of speed so changing the landing speed won't help our cause if we don't maintain runway alignment. Side load is proportional to cornering angle and the weight supported by the tire. Even small cornering angles can produce substantial side loads. For each high-wing, tricycle gear airplane, there is a cornering angle above which roll-over is inevitable. The roll-over axis is a line linking the nose and main wheels. At cornering angles less than the critical angle, the airplane can be controlled with the use of ailerons and rudders, but the use of brakes will generally aggravate the situation. It's much better to make a precise touchdown than to have to save the day with heroic control inputs once on the ground.

Of course, a big mistake is to relax once the airplane makes contact with the ground. It can still act like an unruly toddler and try to dart away. Maintain aileron into the wind but in most tricycle gear airplanes, relax rudder pressure before the nose wheel touches down. Observe proper control position for taxiing in the wind all the way to the parking spot.

Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the mistakes of others and perhaps avoid repeating those mistakes. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.

On Nov. 22, 2007, the pilot and a passenger were killed when their Cessna 177 Cardinal crashed in the traffic pattern at Auburn, California. The sky was clear with 10 miles visibility and the wind was 40 degrees off the runway at 6 kts. The pilot had about 85 hours total flight time. He had made one flight in the accident airplane of 1.7 hours duration 9 days after receiving a rental checkout of about one hour duration. The accident occurred a little less than 3 months after the rental checkout. The airplane had departed about 1.8 hours prior to the accident.

The airplane entered the traffic pattern and as it was on the base leg, the airspeed slowed, and witnesses indicated that it appeared to be at a high angle of attack. The airplane stalled, rolled into a spin, and collided with trees and terrain. No evidence of any pre impact mechanical anomalies was discovered. Serious carburetor icing conditions at glide power existed at the time of the accident; however, whether or not the pilot encountered carburetor icing could not be determined with the available evidence.

Toxicology testing revealed significant concentrations of three different antihistamine drugs present in the blood. The wikipedia references for all three drugs indicate that they can produce drowsiness. One of the drugs, according to the wikipedia entry, can lead to profound drowsiness, blurred vision, short term memory loss, confusion, motor impairment, inability to concentrate, and even hallucinations.

We will never know for sure what was happening in the airplane during the final seconds of the flight. Did the pilot simply allowed the airspeed to deteriorate resulting in the stall/spin, or did some other problem arise? In any case, the pilot was probably not operating with his full faculties and therefore less likely to be able to deal with an emergency.

The NTSB stated the following in its probable cause finding: The pilot failed to maintain an adequate airspeed while maneuvering in the traffic pattern for landing, which resulted in a stall/spin. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's impairment during the flight from the effects of over-the-counter medications. (Read the full NTSB report by clicking here.

Maybe this pilot knew that he shouldn't fly when taking drugs such as these and simply had a reckless disregard for safety. Maybe not. Maybe he knew that flying while taking the drugs wasn't a good idea, but had the very common "It can't happen to me" attitude. Maybe he knew better than to go flying, but succumbed to some external pressure like fulfilling a promise for an airplane ride. There may be more to the story.

That's the problem with being human. We sometimes do things that are not in our best interest. So let's learn from this and avoid flying when using any drug or alcohol that has a chance of impairing our ability. It's easy to fall into the trap and climb into the airplane when we know that we shouldn't. We're not doing anyone a favor by increasing the risk of an accident.

Aviation as we know it is ground zero for a very large warhead that is speeding toward its target at an ever accelerating rate. The people who will be the hardest hit by that bomb seem to be quite unaware of their plight.

Both the airlines and general aviation will be in forever changed when the bomb explodes. It may be too late, but there is still a chance that the missile can be intercepted and destroyed.

The bomb in this case may have several different names such as complacency, apathy, laziness, irresponsibility, or immaturity. Call it what we will, but it is the general degradation of many, not all, pilot's commitment to excellence that has been evident over the past ten or so years. It's a powerful bomb in that if the trend continues, general aviation will be regulated out of existence. The airlines will lose the trust of the flying public causing folks to seek alternatives such as online conferencing and fly only when it absolutely essential.

As an older pilot, it would be convenient to point the blame at the younger generation of pilots. But the disturbing trend, as well as some shining exceptions, is truly cross-generational.

Here are some glaring examples:

On Aug. 27, 2006, a Comair Bombardier CRJ-100 crashed at Lexington, KY killing 49 people and sparing only the first officer. The crew violated sterile cockpit rules and discussed their families and their dogs as they lined up with the wrong, too short runway for departure.

On June 5, 2008, the pilot and sole occupant of an Extra 300 was killed when the airplane crashed near Gothenburg, Nebraska. The pilot was not instrument rated and the airplane was not equipped for instrument flight. The pilot had received a weather briefing which warned of IFR conditions along the route of flight from North Platte, NE to Romeoville, IL. The pilot lost control of the airplane in the IFR conditions. Toxicology tests indicated the recent use of marihuana (within the past three hours) and marihuana was found in a backpack pulled from the wreckage.

On June 8, 2008, a Cessna 206 crashed killing all six people on board near Fremont Ohio. The pilot's medical records indicate that he had been told twice in the two years prior to the crash not to drive a car because of vision problems. He had been involved in four car accidents in the two years preceding the accident, the most recent being only nine days prior.

On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air Bombardier Dash-8 Q400 crashed on approach to Buffalo killing all 49 people on board plus one person on the ground. The flight originated at Newark. During the instrument approach in icing conditions, the crew violated sterile cockpit rules and discussed their working conditions.

On Oct. 28, 2006, a Continental Airlines Boeing 757 enroute from Orlando to Newark carrying 154 people landed on a taxiway rather than the assigned runway. No one was hurt.

On Oct. 20, 2009, a Delta Airlines Boeing 767 carrying 193 people on a flight from Rio Janeiro to Atlanta landed on the parallel taxiway rather than the assigned runway. No one was hurt.

On Oct. 22, 2009 A Northwest Airlines Airbus A-320 carrying 147 people flew past its destination of Minneapolis by 150 miles. At the time of this writing, the crew isn't offering any explanations. No one was hurt.

And these are but a few examples. I could fill a book.

Of course the shining example of true professionalism is the decision making process followed by a successful ditching in the Hudson carried out by Capt. "Sully" Sullenberger in January 2009. In a recent TV interview, the captain simply stated that throughout his flying career, he strove to make each flight better than the one before.

The bomb that is heading our way is excessive regulation coming not from the FAA but from Congress. The FAA is largely impotent in imposing extensive regulatory change due to the influence of the alphabet groups. Congress responds to complaints for action from the general public and a desire to grandstand in front of the media. Congress is already close to passing legislation that will hinder the regional airline industry and flight training institution swithout having a meaningful impact on safety. How far behind can be legislation tightening GA rules? The only defensive weapon we have in our arsenal is to clean up our act and for all pilots to strive to be more like "Sully."

By writing this article in this space, I realize that I am largely "preaching to the choir." Folks reading an aviation safety article are most likely not part of the problem. But the fallout from the bomb will impact all of us so it's up to us to be vocal about the problem. When we see something unsafe going on we need to bring it to the attention of the pilot or the operator. We need to encourage fellow pilots who do not participate in a safety program to join one. Let's not hunker down in our bomb shelters but rather intercept the bomb before it reaches its destination.